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I. INTRODUCTIONTHIS Survey period saw a record number of bankruptcy filings, in-
cluding sizeable public companies in the automobile and retail sec-
tors, among others. In Texas, while the total number of
bankruptcy cases filed increased dramatically from the prior year, the
substantive importance of the rulings issued during the Survey period was
surprisingly limited. The cases discussed in this Article reflect a broad
cross-section of Texas bankruptcy decisions, from the Fifth Circuit's eval-
uation of the permissible scope of non-debtor releases in a Chapter 11
plan' to the determination by the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals
of a trustee's standing in a consumer bankruptcy case following the death
of the debtor.2 Perhaps the most important decision from a bankruptcy
practitioner's perspective is Moglia v. Keith (In re Manchester, Inc.),
which interpreted recent guidance from the Fifth Circuit on the retention
of claims and causes of action under a Chapter 11 plan.3 The authors
expect that the rulings emanating from the cases filed during the next
Survey period will provide a wealth of important legal precedent.
II. APPEALS
In re San Patricio County Community Action Agency
Most bankruptcy practitioners are well acquainted with the doctrine of
equitable mootness, usually in the context of plan confirmation or sales.4
In re San Patricio County Community Action Agency addressed the doc-
trine with respect to a court-approved settlement between the trustee and
the directors and officers (D&O) insurance carrier.5
The lenders purchased vehicles from the debtor, a nonprofit organiza-
tion, and leased the vehicles back to the debtor.6 The debtor believed
1. See Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. (In re
Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 251-53 (5th Cir. 2009).
2. See Bailey v. Barnhart Interest, Inc., 287 S.W.3d 906, 908, 914 (Tex. App.-[14th
Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
3. See No. 09-3027-BJH, 2009 WL 2243592, at *2-6 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 16, 2009).
4. In re San Patricio County Cmty. Action Agency, 575 F.3d 553, 556-58 (5th Cir.
2009).
5. See id. at 557-58.
6. Id. at 555.
[Vol. 63310
Bankruptcy
that it held title to the vehicles. However, because the debtor had origi-
nally purchased the vehicles with funds lent by the State of Texas, the
debtor was without authority to transfer the title to the vehicles. Under a
theory of negligent misrepresentation, the lenders sued the debtor's of-
ficer who had entered into the transaction, and the lenders sought to re-
cover from the debtor's D&O liability insurance.7 There was no dispute
that the insurance did in fact cover the alleged liability. After the debtor
filed a Chapter 7 case, the trustee intervened and initiated various actions
against the debtor's directors and officers for mismanagement.8 The trus-
tee then reached a settlement with the insurance carrier, which was ap-
proved by the bankruptcy court, and an interim distribution of the
settlement funds was made to the trustee's counsel and the state of
Texas. 9 The lenders appealed on various grounds, the principal one con-
cerning the approval of the settlement. The district court dismissed the
appeal on equitable mootness grounds.10
The Fifth Circuit noted that whether the doctrine of equitable moot-
ness is relevant to a Chapter 7 liquidation case is a "threshold issue.""
Noting that the doctrine usually applies to Chapter 11 reorganization
plans, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless refused to hold that the doctrine can-
not apply to Chapter 7 liquidation.12 The circuit then turned to the appli-
cation of the doctrine, which, at its core, provides for the dismissal of an
appeal-no matter how meritorious the appeal may be-when the appel-
late court cannot grant effective relief.13 However, even in the realm of
confirmed Chapter 11 plans, where the doctrine is perhaps the strongest,
the Fifth Circuit noted that the doctrine may not apply even where a plan
has been substantially consummated, and that it may not apply where the
situation concerns professional fees or plan releases.14
The Fifth Circuit stated that the principal factors in assessing equitable
mootness are "(1) whether a stay has been obtained, (2) whether the plan
has been 'substantially consummated,' and (3) whether the relief re-
quested would affect either the rights of parties not before the court or
the success of the plan."' 5 Aside from applying these factors, the circuit
noted, "Equitable mootness is, to be redundant, an equitable doctrine."16
Here, the lender had challenged the trustee's actions, the parties paid by
the interim distribution were the trustee's counsel and the state of Texas
(both presumably able to return the funds), and the lender's appeal
should have been heard.' 7 Although the Fifth Circuit did not foreclose
7. Id. at 555-56.
8. Id. at 556.
9. Id. at 556-57.
10. Id. at 557.





16. Id. at 559.
17. Id. at 556, 559-60.
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the potential of applying the doctrine of equitable mootness to non-plan,
Chapter 7 settlement orders, it noted that stronger equitable mootness
factors were required than the ones before it.18 Although not addressed
in the opinion, it can be imagined that changed circumstances or the prac-
tical inability to return distributions may provide such factors.
In the end, this opinion is significant for two reasons. First, it specifi-
cally refused to preclude the application of the doctrine of equitable
mootness to Chapter 7 cases. 19 Second, it demonstrates that the Fifth
Circuit may be turning toward a more skeptical and limited application of
equitable mootness, at least outside of a Chapter 11 plan that has been
substantially consummated. 20
III. AVOIDANCE ACTIONS
A. Spicer v. United States (In re Motion Marketing Solutions, Inc.)
In Spicer, the Chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid, as a preference, the
perfection of a tax lien by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under
§ 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code. 21 Although the IRS's lien arose
under § 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code, the trustee attacked not the
underlying lien itself, but rather its perfection. 22
The crux of the dispute concerned § 547(c)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which provides that the trustee may not avoid, as a preference, a transfer
"that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section
545 of [the Bankruptcy Code]." 23 The trustee argued that the term "fix-
ing" referred only to the creation of the underlying lien pursuant to
§ 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code, and that it did not refer to the
perfection of that lien, since the Bankruptcy Code uses the term "perfec-
tion" in multiple instances but does not use it in § 547(c)(6).24 The Gov-
ernment, on the other hand, pointed to multiple opinions for the blanket
proposition that a trustee may not use § 547 to avoid a statutory IRS lien
that is not avoidable under § 545 of the Bankruptcy Code.25
The court analyzed statutory language and analogous case law and con-
cluded that the term "fixing," as used in the statute, included the "perfec-
tion" of a lien.2 6 Accordingly, § 547(c)(6) insulates from preference
avoidance the "perfection" of a statutory lien and not just its underlying
creation, unless the lien is otherwise avoidable under § 545 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.27 Although the result may not be surprising, the court's
18. Id. at 559.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Spicer v. United States (In re Motion Mktg. Solutions, Inc.), 403 B.R. 403, 405-06
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
22. Id. at 406.
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) (2006); Spicer, 403 B.R. at 406.
24. Spicer, 403 B.R. at 406.
25. Id. at 406-07.




construction of the term "fixing" is of importance to the bankruptcy prac-
titioner, especially in light of other Bankruptcy Code provisions applying
this phrase.
IV. AUTOMATIC STAY AND STANDING
A. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Labuzan
In St. Paul Fire, the Fifth Circuit considered the question, which it la-
beled as one of first impression, of when a creditor of the estate has
standing to seek recovery for a violation of the automatic stay under
§ 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code.28 Two individuals, who were both
creditors of the debtor and owners of the equity of the debtor, asserted
claims against the insurer for allegedly violating the automatic stay by
contacting account debtors of the Chapter 11 debtor. The insurer's action
arguably resulted in the account debtors' not paying their accounts to the
Chapter 11 debtor, which ultimately led to the conversion of the case.
The district court dismissed on standing grounds, finding that the individ-
uals lacked standing to assert the § 362(k) claim, because the creditors
were owned by the debtor's estate. 29 The Fifth Circuit vacated the dis-
trict court's judgment. 30
First, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that "§ 362(k) creates a private rem-
edy for automatic-stay violations."31 Nevertheless, although a private
remedy existed, the question remained as to who could bring an action on
account of such a remedy. In this respect, the Fifth Circuit held, "To es-
tablish standing pursuant to § 362(k), the [claimants] are required to meet
both constitutional and prudential requirements." 3 2
With respect to constitutional standing, "'a plaintiff must show (1) an
injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant
and (3) that likely will be redressed by a favorable decision." 3 3 These
elements were "easily satisfied" by the claimants.34 Prudential standing,
a judicially created doctrine that operates in addition to constitutional
standing, creates limits on standing and concerns
[(1)] whether a plaintiff's grievance arguably falls within the zone of
interests protected by the statutory provision invoked in the suit,
[(2)] whether the complaint raises abstract questions or a generalized
grievance more properly addressed by the legislative branch, and
[(3)] whether the plaintiff is asserting his or her own legal rights and
interests rather than the legal rights and interests of third parties.35
28. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Labuzan, 579 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2009).
29. Id. at 537.
30. Id. at 545.
31. Id. at 538 (citing Pettitt v. Baker, 876 F.2d 456, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1989)).
32. Id. at 538-39 (citing Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 560 (5th
Cir. 2001)).
33. Id. at 539 (quoting Proctor & Gamble, 242 F.3d at 560).
34. Id.
35. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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Importantly, however, "Congress can 'modify or even abrogate pruden-
tial standing requirements, thus extending standing to the full extent per-
mitted by Article III'."36
St. Paul Fire therefore focused on the language of the statute and, in
particular, the use of the word "individual" in § 362(k) of the Code.37
The Fifth Circuit noted that the Bankruptcy Code employs this term to
refer to both debtors and non-debtors.38 However, since the phrase was
not specifically defined, the Fifth Circuit looked also to congressional in-
tent and legislative history, as well as detailed case law, to conclude that
the claimants had standing to seek damages for the alleged stay violation:
"[T]he congressional purposes behind § 362(k) were debtor, as well as
creditor, protection . .. . "39 The Fifth Circuit did, however, recognize an
important distinction with respect to the individuals' status as both credi-
tors and equity holders: "[The individuals], as pre-petition creditors of [the
debtor], have standing to assert a claim against [the insurer] .... [T]o the
extent the [individuals'] claims are based on their status as owners/equity
holders of [the debtor], § 362(k) cannot be invoked." 40
B. Bailey v. Barnhart Interest, Inc.
In Bailey, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered the
standing of a bankruptcy trustee to pursue the debtor's personal injury
claim following the debtor's death, after the trustee had filed a no-asset
report on the debtor's estate. 41 The debtor filed suit in May 2003 for
personal injuries allegedly sustained from mold exposure while working
in a building managed by the Barnharts. In November 2004, the debtor
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief yet failed to include her pending
state court action against the Barnharts in her listing of the bankruptcy
estate's assets. The debtor died in January 2005 before her Chapter 7
case or her suit against the Barnharts had been resolved.42 The trustee
36. Id. (quoting Proctor & Gamble, 242 F.3d at 560).
37. Id. at 539-40.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 543-44.
40. Id. at 545. It is worth noting that the Fifth Circuit also addressed whether the
claims at issue were property of the bankruptcy estate and, if so, whether they were pro-
tected by the automatic stay such that only the trustee could assert them. See id. at 544-45.
In a nutshell, the Fifth Circuit decided that both the trustee and the individuals had stand-
ing and that the claims at issue were necessarily postpetition claims, while the property-of-
the-estate analysis applied more to prepetition property. Id. This decision is of particular
importance because, in this case, the bankruptcy court approved a settlement between the
trustee and the insurer which compromised the stay-violation claim. The insurer, having
paid the trustee to settle the stay-violation claim pursuant to court order, nevertheless
found itself facing a stay-violation claim from the individuals, although it does not appear
that there was a bar order entered or that the Fifth Circuit analyzed the effects of the
estate releases to great degree. Rather, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the claims at issue
were personal to the individuals as an injury to them separate and apart from the injury to
the estate. See id. at 545.
41. Bailey v. Barnhart Interest, Inc., 287 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
42. Id.
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filed a no-asset report, and the debtor's estate was closed; upon learning
of the state court suit, the trustee filed a motion to withdraw his no-asset
report and reopen the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court granted
the trustee's motion and reopened the case, authorizing the trustee to
pursue the suit against the Barnharts; however, the trial court later
granted the Barnharts' summary judgment motion for judicial estoppel
and denied the trustee's request for a new trial.43
The court of appeals began its analysis with a discussion of the role of
the Chapter 7 trustee as "the real party in interest and the only party with
standing to prosecute causes of action belonging to the estate."" Ac-
cording to the court, "If a debtor fails to schedule an asset and the trustee
later discovers the omission, the trustee may reopen the bankruptcy
case."45 Next, the court addressed judicial estoppel, a process designed to
prevent a party from "'playing fast and loose' with courts to suit the
party's own purposes." 46 The court applied the Fifth Circuit's three-ele-
ment test wherein "[a] party is judicially estopped when (1) its position is
clearly inconsistent with a previous one; (2) the court accepted the previ-
ous position; and (3) the non-disclosure was not inadvertent." 47 The
Barnharts argued that because the trustee "steps into the shoes" of the
debtor, the trustee's claims should be denied because the debtor's failure
to list her suit gave rise to judicial estoppel, citing the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion in In re Superior Crewboats, Inc.4 8 The court of appeals instead ap-
plied the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Kane v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co.,4 9 determining, "Once [the debtor] filed her bankruptcy
petition, [her] suit against the Barnharts became an asset of the bank-
ruptcy estate."50 All rights held by the debtor were extinguished unless
abandoned by the trustee, and the trustee had never abandoned the
debtor's claims.5' Therefore, the trustee, as representative of the debtor's
bankruptcy estate, had standing to prosecute the claim and was not es-
topped from pursuing the suit against the Barnharts. 52
43. Id. at 908-09.
44. Id. at 909.
45. Id. at 910.
46. Id. (quoting Kane v. Nat'1 Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2008)
(per curiam)).
47. Id. at 911 (citing Kane, 535 F.3d at 385-86).
48. Id. In Superior Crewboats, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether debtors could pur-
sue claims for their own benefit that had not been disclosed on the debtors' bankruptcy
schedules and had been abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee; the court concluded that
judicial estoppel barred these claims as a matter of law. 374 F.3d 330, 333-34, 336 (5th Cir.
2004).
49. 535 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2008).
50. Bailey, 287 S.W. 3d at 913. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Kane from Superior
Crewboats on the basis that in Superior Crewboats, the debtors sought to pursue claims for
their own benefit that they had failed to disclose in their bankruptcy schedules. Id. at 912
(citing Kane, 535 F.3d at 387). In Kane, the personal injury claim became an asset of the
bankruptcy estate when the debtors filed their Chapter 7 petition, making the trustee the
real party in interest. Kane, 535 F.3d at 387.




V. CHAPTER 11 PLANS
A. ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE-CRAM DOWN
In re Pacific Lumber Co.
In Pacific Lumber (also discussed below for non-debtor releases), the
bankruptcy court confirmed a plan under cram down as to a class of se-
cured noteholders who objected to the plan and voted against it because
they were not being paid in full and were not given credit bid rights.53
Instead, the plan provided for a cash payment to the noteholders of ap-
proximately $510 million, representing the value of their collateral as
found by the bankruptcy court.
Addressing confirmation under § 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
Fifth Circuit noted, "The absolute priority rule and the fair and equitable
standard must both be satisfied before a court may 'cram down' a reor-
ganization plan over the objection of a dissenting creditor class." 54 The
Fifth Circuit further explained, "The absolute priority rule provides that
'a plan of reorganization may not allocate any property whatsoever to
any junior class on account of their interests or claims in a debtor unless
such senior classes receive property equal in value to the full amount of
their allowed claims.'" 55
Here, the noteholders argued that the plan violated the absolute prior-
ity rule because it directed some of the capital being injected by the plan
funders to classes lower than those of the noteholders. The noteholders
also argued that the plan was not fair and equitable within the meaning of
§ 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code because classes lower than the note-
holders' were receiving a distribution without the noteholders' being paid
in full. 56  Because the noteholders were secured claimants,
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) governed the "fair and equitable" question, which the
Fifth Circuit described as allowing "[t]hree minimum alternatives," con-
sisting of "cash payments having a present value equal to the value of the
collateral," a sale "free and clear" with credit bid rights and replacement
liens on proceeds, or the indubitable equivalent of the claim.57 The bank-
ruptcy court found that the sale provision had no application, because the
plan effectuated a transfer of assets but not a sale.58
The Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court had incorrectly found
that the plan did not effectuate a sale: "That the transaction is complex
does not fundamentally alter that it involved a 'sale' of the Noteholders'
collateral.... [E]very sale of property involves a transfer, but not every
53. Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., N.A. v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. (In re Pa-
cific Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 238-39 (5th Cir. 2009).
54. Id. at 244.
55. Id. at 244 n.20 (quoting 7 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUFTCY I
1129,04[4][a] (15th ed. 2008)).
56. Id. at 244-45.




transfer is a sale. Here, a sale occurred." 59 The noteholders argued that
they should have been allowed to credit bid pursuant to § 363(k) of the
Bankruptcy Code, as provided by the "free and clear" sale provision,
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 60
The Fifth Circuit rejected the noteholders' argument stating that, be-
cause the circuit "has subscribed to the obvious proposition that because
the three subsections of § 1129(b)(2)(A) are joined by the disjunctive
'or,' they are alternatives." 61 The plan could therefore be confirmed on
cram down if the "indubitable equivalent" standard was met, even if one
of the alternative standards was not met.6 2 The Fifth Circuit analyzed
whether this standard was met, noting that the "such claims" language in
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) refers to secured claims which, under the Bankruptcy
Code, equals the value of the collateral. 63 Here, the noteholders were
paid cash equaling the value of their secured claim, as valued by the
bankruptcy court.64 The Fifth Circuit reasoned, "Whatever uncertainties
exist about indubitable equivalent, paying off secured creditors in cash
can hardly be improper if the plan accurately reflected the value of the
Noteholders' collateral." 65 Moreover, with respect to the noteholders'
argument that being cashed out for the value of their collateral removed
any potential benefit to them from later increases in the value of their
collateral, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Bankruptcy Code "does not
protect a secured creditor's upside potential; it protects the 'allowed se-
cured claim." 66
Pacific Lumber is important not only because it confirms that the cram-
down alternatives applicable to secured claims are in fact alternate routes
to confirmation, even if one may be more applicable than another, but
also because it confirms that cashing out a secured creditor for the value
of his lien is the "indubitable equivalent" of the creditor's secured
claim.67 This issue appears not to have been addressed before by the
Fifth Circuit or, for that matter, by many reported opinions by other
courts. It must be noted, however, that the bankruptcy court held an ex-
tensive, evidentiary valuation hearing on which it predicated the value of
the collateral, without which the indubitable equivalent standard would




62. Id. at 246.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 247.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 245-47.




In re Pacific Lumber Co.
In Pacific Lumber, the Fifth Circuit considered the permissible scope of
non-debtor releases in a Chapter 11 plan.6 9 The plan released the postpe-
tition DIP financer, the plan proponents, the purchasers of the reorga-
nized debtor, and the creditor committee members from liability for acts
and omissions "related to proposing, implementing, and administering
the plan," except for willful acts and gross negligence. 70 The released
parties were not co-obligors with the debtor on prepetition debt.
The Fifth Circuit struck the releases with respect to the released parties
other than the creditor committee members and, quoting § 524(e) of the
Bankruptcy Code, noted that the discharge of a debtor does not discharge
any other party. 1 The plan proponents argued that they would not have
been willing to advance funding and proposed a plan without the re-
leases. The Fifth Circuit sidestepped the argument, noting that the cir-
cuit's prior precedents "seem broadly to foreclose non-consensual non-
debtor releases and permanent injunctions." 7 2 Of importance, the Fifth
Circuit looked to whether any of the released parties were jointly liable
for the debtor's prepetition debts, finding that they were not.73 Presuma-
bly, therefore, the result in Pacific Lumber may have been different had
the issue been a temporary injunction preventing the pursuit of claims
against co-obligors to facilitate the reorganization, so long as the plan was
being effectuated. 74
The Fifth Circuit did, however, agree that members of the creditors'
committee may be released, at least with respect to claims other than for
willfulness or gross negligence.75 Although the Fifth Circuit failed to
fully articulate the difference between committee members and other
parties, it noted that the Bankruptcy Code "implies [that] committee
members have qualified immunity for actions [taken] within the scope of
their duties." 76 Presumably, therefore, since leave of the court would be
necessary to sue committee members anyway, and since their actions are
in the nature of professionals or fiduciaries of the estate, the court has
more power to grant broad releases for committee members than for
those without qualified immunity or those that lack professional or fiduci-
ary duties to the estate.77
69. Id. at 236.
70. Id. at 251.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 252.
73. Id.
74. See id. Pacific Lumber cannot be fairly read to reverse prior precedent on such
temporary injunctions.




C. RETENTION OF CLAIMS AND CAUSES OF AcroN
In re Manchester, Inc.
Chapter 11 practitioners know that courts have struggled with respect
to the retention of claims and causes of action in a Chapter 11 plan and
the application of the doctrines of standing, res judicata, judicial estoppel,
and collateral estoppel. The Fifth Circuit's 2008 opinion in In re United
Operating, LLC78 appears only to have increased the confusion.
In Manchester, applying United Operating, the confirmed plan created
a litigation trust and transferred a variety of the estate's claims and causes
of action to the trust for eventual prosecution. 79 Subsequently, the litiga-
tion trustee filed suit against the defendants and asserted various avoid-
ance causes of action, equitable subordination, claim objections, and
recharacterization. The defendants moved to dismiss the causes of ac-
tion, arguing, among other things, that the United Operating precedent
compelled such dismissal because the litigation trustee lacked standing to
assert those claims. Construing United Operating, Chief Judge Barbara
Houser noted that, in order to preserve the claims and standing, the plan
must "expressly retain the right to pursue such actions" and the reserva-
tion of the claims must be "specific and unequivocal."80 The court noted
that, although the issue of claims retention traditionally revolved around
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, United Operating
phrased the inquiry in terms of standing.81
In Manchester, the plan broadly provided that "all Causes of Action
shall be transferred to the Litigation Trust as of the Effective Date, to be
pursued by the Litigation Trustee, as a representative of the Estates
under section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code for the benefit of
Claims Holders as set forth in the Plan."82 The plan further provided that
the litigation trustee "shall have the exclusive right to prosecute" the es-
tate's claims and causes of action so transferred, and the plan specifically
defined both "causes of action" and "avoidance actions" broadly, but ap-
parently without specifically naming the defendants or the applicable
causes of action retained.83
The court held that "the Plan specifically and unequivocally preserved
the Avoidance Actions for pursuit by the Litigation Trustee" because, in
keeping with United Operating and other precedent, the plan did not
have to name the actual defendants who were the subject of such causes
of action in order to retain them.84 "Thus, while creditors must be told in
78. Dynasty Oil & Gas, LLC v. Citizens Bank (In re United Operating, LLC), 540
F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2008).
79. Moglia v. Keith (In re Manchester, Inc.), No. 09-3027-BJH, 2009 WL 2243592, at
*1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 16, 2009).
80. Id. at *3 (quoting United Operating, 540 F.3d at 355).
81. Id.
82. Id. at *4 (emphasis and footnote omitted).
83. See id. at *4-5 (noting that "the Plan did not identify the specific individuals or
entities that the Litigation Trustee intended to sue").
84. Id. at *5.
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the plan of reorganization that avoidance actions will be pursued post-
confirmation by the representative of the estate, the individual prospec-
tive defendants do not have to be identified in the plan."85
However, with respect to the non-avoidance actions, the court held
that "the Plan failed to specifically and unequivocally retain the right to
pursue those claims" within the dictates of United Operating.86 Although
the plan's definition of "causes of action" was broad enough to encom-
pass the claims, the plan failed to specifically identify them and it failed to
expressly transfer them to the litigation trust.87 Thus, the court found an
important distinction between avoidance and non-avoidance causes of ac-
tion for retention purposes-hence the significance of Manchester.88 Of
interest, Chief Judge Houser noted that she reached her decision with
"great reluctance," and, in a lengthy and detailed footnote, she urged the
Fifth Circuit to reconsider its United Operating opinion.89 Suffice it to say
that neither United Operating nor Manchester will put these difficult and
sometimes contradictory issues and precedents to rest.
VI. INSIDER COMPENSATION
In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp.
In re Pilgrim's Pride dealt with the Bankruptcy Code provision limiting
insider benefits as administrative claims that was added as part of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA).90 Postpetition, the debtors' chief executive officer and chief
operating officer resigned. 91 The debtors filed a motion seeking the
court's approval to enter into consulting agreements with the two former
officers, essentially continuing their prepetition compensation for a pe-
riod of time postpetition.92 Of interest, the debtors testified that they did
not require consulting agreements from the former officers. Rather, they
testified that the purpose behind the consulting agreements was to ensure
that the former officers would not be able to solicit the debtors' clients on
behalf of the debtors' competitors; in other words, the payments were
essentially funds to obtain non-competition agreements from the former
officers. 93
The United States Trustee objected to the motion under § 503(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code, added by Congress in 2005 to protect against postpeti-
tion "golden parachutes" and other perceived excess insider compensa-





89. Id. at *5 n.6.
90. In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 401 B.R. 229, 233-35 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
91. Id. at 232-33.
92. Id. at 233.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 232; see id. at 234.
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postpetition insider compensation to induce the insider to continue pro-
viding services to the debtor (e.g., key employee retention plan (KERP)
motions), unless: (i) the services of the individual are essential; (ii) the
individual has a bona fide offer from another business for higher compen-
sation; and (iii) the compensation does not exceed certain limitations im-
posed by the Bankruptcy Code.95 The court, however, construed the
question as relating not to postpetition insider compensation, but rather
to the purchase of a non-compete agreement from the prior officers. 96
The court accordingly held that § 503(c)(1) did not apply to the facts at
bar, since the trigger for that section is that the transfer be "for the pur-
pose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor's business." 97
However, § 503(c)(3) did apply, because it addresses transfers outside the
ordinary course to, among others, officers of the debtor.98
Section 503(c)(3) prohibits such transfers when not "justified by the
facts and circumstances of the case." 99 The questions before the court
were which factors to apply to this standard and whether the proposed
transaction fell within the standard.1oo First addressing the traditional
business judgment rule as normally applicable to postpetition business
decisions, the court concluded that this normally deferential standard did
not apply: "[Elven if a good business reason can be articulated for a
transaction, the court must still determine that the proposed transfer or
obligation is justified in the case before it."10o
Ultimately, the court approved the transaction.102 Although the court
did not set forth a list of factors or a litmus test to be used in determining
what is justified by the "facts and circumstances," it looked at whether
the transaction served the interests of creditors, whether it was in the
estate's best interest, whether the debtors had other viable alternatives,
and whether the negotiations were undertaken at arm's length. 03 The
court also weighed the cost of the transaction (half a million dollars)
against its benefit to the estates (the provision of the officers' freely solic-
iting the debtor's customers, even one of which may have been worth
hundreds of millions of dollars).104
VII. INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY
In re Smith
In re Smith provides an excellent discussion of the elements involved
95. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1) (2006). The Bankruptcy Code also limits postpetition trans-
fers for severance payments to an insider. Id. § 503(c)(2).
96. In re Pilgrim's Pride, 401 B.R. at 235.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 236.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 236-37.
101. Id. at 237.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 237-38.
104. Id. at 238.
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with an involuntary petition.' 05 It discusses numerous issues and factors
governing which claims are included under § 303(b) and (h).'on
Of all the issues addressed by In re Smith, the one that is perhaps the
most novel concerns whether a prepetition judgment taken against the
alleged debtor is the subject of a bona fide dispute under § 303(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code in light of a prepetition appeal taken of the judg-
ment.107 The court reviewed applicable Texas precedent holding that "a
judgment is final for the purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel
despite the taking of an appeal, unless the appeal consists of a trial de
novo." 08 The court additionally reviewed persuasive case law and un-
published opinions from the Fifth Circuit, which had concluded that a
prepetition judgment was not subject to bona fide dispute notwithstand-
ing the pendency of an appeal of the judgment.109
Ultimately, the court concluded that the judgment was not subject to
bona fide dispute even though it was appealed. 10 In the process, the
court confirmed that it is normally not the province of a federal court to
look behind the merits of a state court judgment:
"[J]udgments go a long way toward establishing the absence of a
bona fide dispute," and "it will be the unusual case in which a bona
fide dispute exists in the face of claims reduced to state court judg-
ments.... [T]he Court will not look behind the state court judgment
and finds that it is not the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability
or amount."'
VIII. JURISDICTION
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey
In Travelers Indemnity, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed the broad
and continuing jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the finality of its
orders, in this instance decades after the bankruptcy court entered an as-
bestos-related channeling injunction.11 2 In 1986, the bankruptcy court
confirmed a plan of reorganization for the Johns-Manville Corporation, a
major supplier of asbestos. As part of the plan, the bankruptcy court
approved a settlement whereby the debtor's insurers would contribute to
the asbestos claimants' trust, and the bankruptcy court entered a channel-
ing injunction which included a release of those insurers from any "Policy
Claims," which were broadly defined as "claims" and "allegations"
against the insurers "based upon, arising out of or relating to" the
105. Id. at 237-38, 237 n.14.
106. In re Smith, 415 B.R. 222 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009).
107. See id. at 229-31.
108. Id. at 229 (citing Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 1986)).
109. Id. at 229-30.
110. Id. at 231.
111. Id. at 231 (quoting In re Byrd, 357 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal citation
omitted)).
112. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195, 2198, 2202 (2009).
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Manville insurance policies. 13 The claimants, who had sued the insurers,
argued that they were not prohibited from proceeding against the insur-
ers, because those claims were not based on the debtor's wrongdoing but
rather on the insurers' own alleged wrongdoing and breaches of state
statutes and common law. The bankruptcy court nevertheless interpreted
its prior order as enjoining such suits and entered a supplemental order
enjoining the claimants' suits. 1 1 4
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the claims
at issue fell within the scope of the original jurisdiction."15 However, it
concluded that the bankruptcy court could not enjoin actions over which
it had no jurisdiction, in other words, that the claims were asserted
against a non-debtor for its own alleged conduct and not for the debtor's
alleged conduct.116 Therefore, the Second Circuit, while agreeing that
the bankruptcy court could interpret its prior orders, reversed the injunc-
tion and held that the bankruptcy court could not enjoin the instant
claims, because they were not based on the debtor's alleged wrongdoing
but rather on the insurers' alleged wrongdoing.117
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, although it agreed
with the circuit that the bankruptcy court had continuing and appropriate
jurisdiction to enforce its prior orders and enjoin the present suits."18
With respect to the funds contributed by the insurers toward the asbestos
claimants, the Court noted, "There would have been no such payment
without the injunction at the heart of the present dispute."119 The Court
further agreed that the actions fell within the scope of the original injunc-
tion.120 With respect to the ultimate issue, the Court noted that perhaps
the Second Circuit would have been correct, and would have been able to
examine the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, were the Circuit reviewing
the injunction on direct appeal.121 Here, however, the challenge was not
a direct-appeal challenge and was brought decades after the bankruptcy
court's injunction became final and non-appealable.
The Court noted that when the injunctions became
final on direct review (whether or not proper exercises of bankruptcy
court jurisdiction and power), they became res judicata to the "'par-
ties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which
was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand,
but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered
for that purpose.' "122
113. Id. at 2199.
114. Id. at 2201.
115. Id. at 2202.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2203.
119. Id. at 2199.
120. Id. at 2203.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2205 (quoting Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 119, 130 (1983) (in turn
quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1877))).
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It further held, "Those orders are not any the less preclusive because the
attack is on the Bankruptcy Court's conformity with its subject-matter
jurisdiction, for '[e]ven subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may not be at-
tacked collaterally.'"123 The Court noted that its holding was a limited
one and that it was not resolving "whether a bankruptcy court, in 1986 or
today, could properly enjoin claims against nondebtor insurers that are
not derivative of the debtor's wrongdoing." 12 4 The effect of the Court's
holding is therefore straightforward: A final, non-appealable order is just
that, and, so long as due process was complied with in arriving at that
order, a jurisdictional attack will not normally be successful by way of a
collateral proceeding as opposed to direct review.125
The Court's holding is important given the long-term effects of bank-
ruptcy court final orders, affecting numerous individuals in each case and
the certainty that parties may have regarding the finality and enforceabil-
ity of an order in light of threatened future piecemeal collateral attack.
What Travelers Indemnity means to well-established principles which
hold that a void order (here, void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction)
remains subject to collateral review is uncertain.126
IX. PROFESSIONALS
In re Energy Partners, Ltd.
Chances are that most bankruptcy professionals, whether they be attor-
neys, accountants, turnaround experts, or investment bankers, know in
one fashion or another Judge Bohm's opinion in Energy Partners, Ltd., in
which he lambasted investment bankers for what he considered greedy
and unconscionable fee structures. 127 The opinion is included here not
only because of its notoriety, but because its result is likely to be seen
again, even if not through so strongly worded an indictment. Bankruptcy
courts are becoming warier of, and are applying greater scrutiny to, carte
blanche fee structures involving investment bankers and similar profes-
sionals,128 and they appear to be applying stricter scrutiny to compensa-
tion mechanisms proposed under § 328 of the Bankruptcy Code.
In Energy Partners, Ltd., the creditors' committee and the equity com-
mittee sought to retain investment banking firms to provide valuations of
the debtor's business and assets with compensation fixed under § 328 of
the Bankruptcy Code. Although two other firms provided similar valua-
tions, the investment bankers demanded nonrefundable fees aggregating
$1 million, in addition to other compensation.129
123. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 n.9 (2004)).
124. Id. at 2207.
125. See id. at 2205-06.
126. See id. at 2205.
127. See In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 409 BR. 211, 237-39 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
128. The authors are aware of other instances in which bankruptcy courts voiced the
same concerns, albeit not by published opinion.
129. Energy Partners, Ltd., 409 B.R. at 215.
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The opinion started off poorly for the investment bankers, and it only
got worse from there. The court opened by stating:
Oblivious to recent congressional and public criticism over execu-
tives of publicly-held corporations who are paid monumental salaries
and bonuses despite running their companies into the ground, two
investment banking firms now come into this Court requesting that
they be employed under similarly outrageous terms. . . . This Court
declines the opportunity to endorse such arrogance. The purse is too
perverse.130
The court chastised the committees for forgetting to act with what the
court labeled "a measure of frugality."131 The court quoted with ap-
proval the following language: "The estate is not a cash cow to be milked
to death by professionals seeking compensation for services rendered to
the estate which have not produced a benefit commensurate with the fees
sought."132 The court's main criticism, however, was directed at the in-
vestment bankers:
These two investment banking firms have become hogs. Indeed, the
investment bankers in the case at bar appear to have embraced the
outlook expressed by Michael Douglas's character, Gordon Gekko,
in the film Wall Street that "Greed-for lack of a better word-is
good. Greed is right. Greed works." That may be how Wall Street
views the world, but it is not how this Court sees things.' 33
While Energy Partners, Ltd. is forceful, to say the least, ultimately it
boils down to questions of duplication, pre-approval of fees, use of cash
collateral, and benefits to the estate.134 Setting aside the forceful lan-
guage, this opinion offers a highly useful summary for the professional of
various factors and standards governing the retention of professionals
and regulating compensation schemes under § 328 of the Bankruptcy
Code.
X. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
A. In re Amaravathi Ltd. Partnership
In Amaravathi, the bankruptcy court considered an issue sure to be of
increasing importance as commercial real estate defaults are projected to
increase.' 3 5 Specifically, the court considered whether postpetition rents
from an apartment complex were property of the bankruptcy estate in
light of a prepetition absolute assignment of rents.136 Although the pre-
cise procedure before the court concerned the debtor's use of cash collat-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 216 (quoting In re Chas. A. Stevens & Co., 105 B.R. 866, 871-72 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1989)).
133. Id. at 237.
134. See id. at 223, 235.




eral, this issue turned on the question of whether the rents were property
of the estate in the first instance.137
While the court acknowledged the general rule that state law defines
property interests in bankruptcy, the court noted two important excep-
tions: "[Tlhere is an exception if Congress modifies state law through leg-
islation enacted under Congress's 'authority . . . to establish "uniform
laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,""' and
"state property law must relent 'if some federal interest requires a differ-
ent result."' 138 The court then analyzed § 541(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which provides that property of the estate includes "[p]roceeds,
product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the estate." 139
The postpetition rents were "rents" within the meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, for they derived from what was clearly property of the es-
tate in the form of the apartment buildings.140 In addition to this
statutory application, the court noted multiple fundamental bankruptcy
policies and goals supporting its construction, including that by removing
rents from property of the estate, the estate would have no source of
income and therefore no possibility to rehabilitate, while still being obli-
gated to pay the operating expenses of the apartment buildings for the
creditor.141
The court also analyzed Texas law and addressed the differences be-
tween an "absolute" assignment of rents and a "collateral" assignment of
rents.142 Although that analysis is important, the ultimate significance of
Amaravathi is that postpetition rents under an assignment of rents are
property of the estate under federal law, although, of course, they consti-
tute cash collateral and the provisions of § 363 governing the use of cash
collateral apply.143
B. In re Nowlin
In re Nowlin centers upon whether a bankruptcy court may consider a
future event that is reasonably certain to occur when projecting a debtor's
disposable income.144 The debtor filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and as
an "above-median debtor," she was required to file a plan with a mini-
mum applicable commitment period of five years. According to the
debtor, a loan from her 401(k) account would be repaid within two years,
freeing up $1,134.79 per month in her budget. She argued that these ad-
ditional funds "should not be considered for confirmation purposes be-
cause the calculation of 'projected disposable income' under § 1325(b)(1)
137. Id. at 621.
138. Id. at 622 (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979) (in turn
quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ch. 4)).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2006).
140. Amaravathi, 416 B.R. at 623-24.
141. Id. at 626.
142. See id. at 628-30.
143. See id. at 637.
144. 576 F.3d 258, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2009).
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should be mechanical, involving nothing more than (1) determining her
current disposable income under § 1325(b)(2), and (2) multiplying that
amount by the plan's term."145 The trustee argued for a forward-looking
approach to the definition of "projected disposable income" so that the
funds in question would be allocated to repay the debtor's creditors.146
The bankruptcy court denied the debtor's proposed plan, holding that
"'projected disposable income' . . . requires the Debtor to account for any
events which will definitely occur during the term of the Plan that would
alter either the income or expense side of the disposable income calcula-
tion."147 On the debtor's appeal, the district court confirmed the bank-
ruptcy court's holding.148
The Fifth Circuit noted a split among circuit courts in the interpreta-
tions of the change Congress wrought in BAPCPA when it placed a new
definition of "disposable income" in § 1325(b)(2) immediately following
a reference to "projected disposable income" in § 1325(b)(1)(B).149 The
Fifth Circuit conducted an analysis of the definition of "projected" and
adopted the forward-looking approach advocated by the trustee. 50 It
noted that "disposable income" is a starting point and that a party may
present evidence of reasonably certain future events that could change
the debtor's financial position, yet it acknowledged that some future
events may be too speculative to impact a debtor's budget.' 5 ' The Fifth
Circuit's decision aligns with holdings of the Eighth Circuit and Tenth
Circuit; the Ninth Circuit, by comparison, adopted the mechanical ap-
proach to the new definition of "projected disposable income."152
XI. SALES
A. In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp.
Gulf Coast Oil Corp. is a significant opinion in the continuing question
of sales of substantially all of a debtor's assets under § 363(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, as opposed to a plan.153 After approximately six
months in Chapter 11, and at a time when the bankruptcy court found
145. Id. at 261.
146. Id.
147. Id. The Bankruptcy Code provision quoted was added by BAPCPA.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 261-62; see 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2006).
150. Id. at 262-63. The Fifth Circuit explained, "We recognize that both approaches
create difficulties, but we are persuaded that the Trustee's approach best comports with the
statutory language." Id. at 263.
151. Id. at 260, 263, 266-67.
152. See id. at 266 ("We join the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in adopting a forward-look-
ing interpretation of 'projected disposable income' in § 1325(b)(1). . . . The position
adopted by [the debtor) and the Ninth Circuit . .. overly emphasizes the modified defini-
tion of 'disposable income' without recognizing the independent significance of the word
'projected."'). Of note, one month after In re Nowlin, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Ohio (Sixth Circuit) disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's statutory inter-
pretation, evidencing a further split among courts. See In re Boyd, 414 B.R. 223, 231
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009).
153. In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 410-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
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that it had become "clear that a reorganization of Debtors' business was
not possible," the debtors moved to sell substantially all of their assets to
their sole secured lender under § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.154 The
sale included assigning to the secured lender various valuable executory
contracts, chosen by the lender. The lender would also choose which em-
ployees and vendors the debtors would continue doing business with. Of
interest, the debtors' financial advisors objected to the proposed sale, ar-
guing that it would not provide for the payment of all administrative
claims.
The bankruptcy court denied the proposed sale, finding that it thwarted
Chapter 11's reorganization scheme and that the debtors should have
proposed a plan.155 The court first noted that a bankruptcy sale may be
effectuated under § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code or under a plan, and
the court discussed the differences between the two, including the re-
quirements for a plan: a disclosure statement, creditor voting, and a de-
termination of whether the plan meets the statutory requirements.15 6
The court further analyzed Fifth Circuit jurisprudence on sales outside a
plan, sub rosa plans, and the Braniff precedent.157 The court construed
this precedent as addressing the Bankruptcy Code's "carefully crafted
scheme for creditor enfranchisement where plans of reorganization are
concerned." 58 According to the court, "when a transaction materially
interfere[s] with that 'carefully crafted scheme', the transaction [may] not
be authorized by a bankruptcy court under § 363(b)."15 9 But the court
pointed out that the Fifth Circuit in Braniff "expressly declined to hold
that the sale of all property of the estate was per se improper."160 The
court continued reviewing applicable case law and persuasive authority,
but it also noted something new, which bankruptcy practitioners are al-
ready familiar with:
Unprecedented liquidity in the capital markets, investment strategies
that include significant claims trading in large cases, alleged "loan to
own" strategies, active participation in bankruptcy cases by hedge
funds and other non-bank lending entities, and venue selection based
on a court's perceived propensity to approve § 363(b) sales without
requiring satisfaction of chapter 11 confirmation requirements have
altered the landscape of chapter 11 in large cases. While these fac-
tors have initially appeared in the very large cases, the practice in
smaller cases has followed the lead of the larger cases. . . . (T]he
result has been a huge increase in motions to sell substantial parts
(or all) of the estate under § 363(b) prior to plan confirmation.16 1
154. Id. at 410-11.
155. Id. at 427-28.
156. Id. at 414-15.
157. Id. at 415 (discussing In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 939 (5th Cir.
1983))..
158. Id. (quoting Braniff, 700 F.2d at 940).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 418-19.
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Indeed, the court observed, "Corporate reorganizations have all but
disappeared. Giant corporations make headlines when they file for
Chapter 11, but they are no longer using it to rescue a firm from immi-
nent failure. Many use Chapter 11 merely to sell their assets and divide
up the proceeds." 162 As held by the court, the debtor must show that
there is a need for a sale prior to a plan, not just that it does not matter
whether the sale is by motion under § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code or
under a plan.163
Having reviewed the available precedent and guidance, and noting that
it would be helpful for the Fifth Circuit to provide additional direction,
the bankruptcy court looked at the following factors to determine
whether a sufficient reason had been demonstrated to approve a sale of
substantially all assets under § 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: (i) "Is
there evidence of a need for speed?"; (ii) "What is the business justifica-
tion?"; (iii) "Is the case sufficiently mature to assure due process?"; (iv)
"Is the proposed [sale agreement] sufficiently straightforward to facilitate
competitive bids or [is] the purchaser the only potential interested
party?"; (v) "Have the assets been aggressively marketed in an active
market?"; (vi) "Are the fiduciaries that control the debtor truly disinter-
ested?"; (vii) "Does the proposed sale include all of a debtor's assets and
does it include the 'crown jewel'?"; (viii) "What extraordinary protections
does the purchaser want?"; (ix) "How burdensome would it be to pro-
pose the sale as part of confirmation of a chapter 11 plan?"; (x) "Who will
benefit from the sale?"; (xi) "Are [s]pecial [a]dequate [p]rotection
[m]easures [n]ecessary and [p]ossible?"; (xii) "Was the hearing a true ad-
versary presentation?"; (xiii) "Is the integrity of the bankruptcy process
protected?"; and (xiv) "Other factors that apply to the case at hand."IM
Applying these factors, the court denied the sale motion.x65 As ex-
plained by the court,
[T]he essence of the proposed transaction is a foreclosure supple-
mented materially by a release, by assignment of executory contracts
(but only the contracts chosen by the secured lender), by a federal
court order eliminating any successor liability, and by preservation of
the going concern. Congress provided a process by which these ben-
efits could be obtained. That scheme requires bargaining, voting,
and a determination by the Court that Bankruptcy Code § 1129 re-
quirements are met.166
Gulf Coast Oil Corp. is an important case, because it is rare that a
bankruptcy court will deny a motion to sell substantially all assets, espe-
cially where, as here, the court finds that reorganization is not possible.167
162. Id. at 419 (quoting Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bank-
ruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REv. 751, 751 (2002)).
163. Id. at 428.
164. Id. at 422-27.
165. Id. at 427-28.




One important question is whether the same result would have been ob-
tained had the buyer not been the secured lender, or had the secured
lender offered consideration to pay administrative claims at the least, and
perhaps something for unsecured creditors. Many practitioners have
voiced concerns over § 363(b) sales of substantially all assets, and Gulf
Coast Oil Corp. considered a factual pattern that best brought these con-
cerns to light.168 As the opinion acknowledges, however, there are valid
reasons for a sale of substantially all assets, and such a sale is not fore-
closed by Fifth Circuit precedent.169 A secured lender wishing to use
bankruptcy as a clearinghouse for its collateral, however, will have added
obstacles to achieving such a sale, even if those obstacles are only the
philosophical and policy considerations that such a transaction
implicates.170
B. Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC
The Survey period saw a flurry of bankruptcy activity with respect to
the fast mega-cases of General Motors and Chrysler.' 7' As was widely
reported, the U.S. Supreme Court became involved, originally issuing a
temporary stay of Chrysler's sale of substantially all of its operating busi-
ness.172 Shortly thereafter, however, the Court dissolved the temporary
stay of the sale order173 and effectively dismissed the appeal as moot.17 4
The Supreme Court's brief decisions in Chrysler do not set forth any
particularly novel point of law, although the Court confirmed the ele-
ments applicable to the issuance of a stay pending appeal.175 The deci-
sions are of importance because they brought the Court into the frequent
and customary bankruptcy world of the appeal of sale orders and the ap-
plication of equitable mootness which frequently follows. The decisions
are significant not for what they say or for what they do not say, but
rather for what they effectuate: well-established bankruptcy law making it
very difficult to reverse a sale order that has not been stayed or to obtain
such a stay in the first place. In other words, the Supreme Court did what
many appellate courts do in this situation, and the mere fact that it is the
highest court in the land did not suffice to disrupt the bankruptcy sales
process.
168. See id. at 411-14.
169. See In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 939-40 (5th Cir. 1983); Gulf Coast Oil
Corp., 404 B.R. at 415, 428.
170. See Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. at 428.
171. See generally In re Chrysler, LLC, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Gen. Motors
Corp., 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
172. See Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2275, 2276 (2009)
(per curiam).
173. Id. at 2276-77.
174. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler, 130 S. Ct. 1015, 1015 (2009). Although
the Court did not elaborate on its justification for the dismissal, it apparently employed the
doctrine of equitable mootness, applied severely to asset sales in light of §363(m) of the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006); Chrysler, 130 S. Ct. at 1015.
175. Chrysler, 129 S. Ct. at 2276.
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XII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND REPOSE
Stanley v. Trinchard
Practitioners are well aware of § 108 of the Bankruptcy Code and, in
particular, the additional period specified by § 108(a) providing the trus-
tee added time to commence a suit notwithstanding the expiration of a
non-bankruptcy statute of limitations. 176 In Stanley, the Fifth Circuit
broadly considered the related, but different, question of whether the
§ 108(a) enlargement period likewise applies to a statute of repose. 77
Although the Stanley litigation had been the subject of an extensive
line of Fifth Circuit and district court opinions, the facts at issue in this
opinion were straightforward: The trustee commenced suit against the
debtor's attorneys for breaches of professional and fiduciary duties after
the applicable Louisiana limitations period had expired. 78 Of particular
importance, the underlying statute provided that the limitations period
was "peremptive"' 79 and that such a period "may not be renounced, in-
terrupted, or suspended."180 The district court described this statutory
provision as conferring a substantive property right and concluded, "In
light of the fact that the rights attached to a peremptive period extinguish
upon the expiration of that period and that peremptive periods cannot be
interrupted or suspended, applying Section 108(a) to peremptive periods
would impermissibly alter substantive property rights as defined by Loui-
siana law."181 The district court therefore analyzed the situation as in-
volving a substantive property right that is lost prepetition (similar to the
expiration of a contract or lease right), a right which cannot be revived
upon expiration.182
The Fifth Circuit, styling the underlying statute as a statute of repose,
disagreed.183 The Fifth Circuit reviewed prior precedent confirming that
property rights are normally defined by non-bankruptcy law and noted
that it was "sympathetic to the importance of preserving state law prop-
erty rights intact in bankruptcy."184 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit noted
Congress's express constitutional power to provide for bankruptcy laws,
and the circuit interpreted §108(a) broadly to include "any" period fixed
by non-bankruptcy law.185 Therefore, "bankruptcy law . . . takes prece-
dence over state laws under the Supremacy Clause," and the statute itself
is broad enough to encompass statutes of repose: "The statute's clear pur-
176. See 11 U.S.C. § 108 (2006).
177. Stanley v. Trinchard, 579 F.3d 515, 516-18 (5th Cir. 2009).
178. Id. at 516-17.
179. A peremptive period is the civil law's equivalent of a statute of repose. Id. at 518
n.3.
180. Id. at 518 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 9:5605(b)).
181. Id. at 517.
182. See id. at 517-18.
183. Id. at 518 & n.3 (noting that "[n]o legal distinction exists" between common-law
statutes of repose and the civil-law "preemptive period").




pose is to afford bankruptcy trustees extra time to assess and pursue po-
tential assets of the debtor's estate. Congress drew no distinction among
the state law vehicles that govern time limits for filing suit, whether stat-
utes of limitations or prescription, repose or peremption."186
XIII. CONSUMER
A. In re Camp
In re Camp addressed the dismissal of a consumer Chapter 7 case
under § 707 of the Bankruptcy Code and the changes made by
BAPCPA. 87 The court addressed both the "means test" and grounds for
dismissal for "substantial abuse" under § 707(b).188
Regarding the means test, the United States Trustee argued that the
debtors' obligations relating to a home they had surrendered postpetition
should not be considered when calculating disposable income. The court
agreed that "the means test calculation should occur as of the filing of the
trustee's motion to dismiss, and the court should consider any changed
circumstances of the debtor between the filing of the petition and the
filing of the motion." 189 With respect to a dismissal for substantial abuse,
the court looked at the totality of the circumstances, meaning that "the
debtor's post-petition surrender of the property may be considered in de-
termining whether granting Chapter 7 relief is, in fact, abusive under the
totality of the circumstances."1 90 The issue of whether a postpetition sur-
render of a home should be used in determining whether there was a
presumption that the filing of the petition was abusive did not directly
have to be resolved. 191
With respect to substantial abuse, the court noted that BAPCPA
changed the test from "substantial abuse" to just "abuse," but the court
considered the prior case law in addressing the lessened standard. 192 The
applicable factors included:
(1) Whether the Debtors could pay a substantial portion of their
debts from future income in a hypothetical Chapter 13 case; (2)
Whether the bankruptcy petition was filed due to sudden illness, ca-
lamity, disability, or unemployment; (3) Whether the Debtors in-
curred cash advances and made consumer purchases far in excess of
their ability to repay; (4) Whether the Debtors' proposed family
budget is reasonable; (5) Whether the Debtors are seeking to reaf-
firm a large amount of secured debt to the detriment of unsecured
creditors; (6) Whether the Debtors' schedules and statement of cur-
rent income and expenses reasonably and accurately reflect their
186. Id.
187. 416 B.R. 304, 305-06 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009).
188. See id. at 306 (addressing changes made by BAPCPA).
189. Id. at 311 (citing In re Singletary, 354 B.R. 455, 466 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006)).
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 311-12 (noting that such "preBAPCPA cases ... remain instructive in an
analysis under" the new standard).
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true financial condition; (7) Whether the Debtors have a stable
source of income; (8) Whether the Debtors are eligible to file a
Chapter 13 case; (9) Whether there are state remedies or private ne-
gotiations that the Debtors can invoke to ease their financial predic-
ament; (10) Whether the Debtors' expenses can be reduced without
depriving the Debtors of basic necessities; and (11) Whether the pe-
tition was filed in good faith. 193
Here, the debtors' discretionary spending was high, they had stable em-
ployment and high income (the husband was a pilot for a major airline for
many years), and they were spending money for luxury and retirement
purposes. Thus, although the debtors were burdened with some financial
problems, "they were enjoying a relatively affluent lifestyle." 194 Al-
though the Bankruptcy Code does not require the dismissal of a case
where a debtor has substantial financial means, debtors with substantial
and stable employment "will be hard pressed to establish that they do not
have the ability to pay some of their unsecured debt, such as through
funding a Chapter 13 plan of reorganization." 195 Accordingly, the court
ordered the dismissal of the case unless the debtors elected to convert to
Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 within a specified timeframe.196
Of interest is what the court concluded in its summary:
The Debtors have been living beyond their means, and the totality of
the monthly expenses reported by the Debtors does not reflect sig-
nificant belt-tightening. The Debtors likewise do not appear to have
prioritized their expenses to fit within their monthly income. The
Debtors enjoy a stable income and good health, and their creditors
should not be forced to bear the burden of maintaining the same
lifestyle that precipitated this bankruptcy.197
B. In re Miller
In Miller, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the "hanging paragraph"
of § 1325(a), added by BAPCPA, prevents a creditor with a purchase
money security interest (PMSI) in a "910 vehicle" from obtaining a state-
law deficiency judgment for the portion of a debt not satisfied by a sale of
the surrendered vehicle.198 The factual background centered upon the
purchase of vehicle financed by DaimlerChrysler (DC). DC had a first-
priority PMSI on the vehicle when the debtor filed a voluntary petition
for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The debtor proposed to surrender the vehicle
in full satisfaction of his $34,000 debt, but DC objected to the plan. The
bankruptcy court affirmed the debtor's plan and held that the hanging
paragraph applied. 99 The Fifth Circuit took the case on direct appeal.20 0
193. Id. at 312.
194. Id. at 313.
195. Id. (quoting In re Wadsworth, 383 B.R. 330, 333-34 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007)).
196. Id. at 314.
197. Id.
198. In re Miller, 570 F.3d 633, 635-36 (5th Cir. 2009).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 635.
2010]1 Bankruptcy 333
SMU LAW REVIEW
It conducted an extensive statutory analysis of the hanging paragraph's
instruction that § 506 does not apply to § 1325(a)(5) if the creditor has a
PMSI securing a debt incurred within 910 days before the petition on a
motor vehicle acquired for personal use.201
The Fifth Circuit noted two approaches to the issue and that the once-
majority "full-satisfaction position" has been rejected by circuit courts in
favor of the once-minority "deficiency position." 202 The former majority
view held that a debtor could "surrender a 910 vehicle in full satisfaction
of his debt regardless of whether the car was worth less than the total
amount of debt," while the former minority view held that a creditor
could "still pursue any remaining debt on a 910 vehicle under state law,
regardless of the [inapplicability] of § 506."203 The Fifth Circuit adopted
the "deficiency position," 204 although it rejected the reasoning of the
Sixth Circuit's "equity-of-the-statute" approach to the deficiency posi-
tion.205 The Sixth Circuit's approach relied on "filling a gap" in the stat-
ute with prior bankruptcy law to conform to congressional intent; the
Fifth Circuit rejected this approach as flawed and applied a plain-lan-
guage interpretation. 206 Miller offers insight into how the Fifth Circuit
may address the statutory interpretation of BAPCPA, legislation the Fifth
Circuit acknowledged "has been criticized by some judges and commen-
tators as being 'poorly drafted." 207
The Fifth Circuit expressly joined the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits' adoption of the deficiency method and determined
that state law applied when the Code did not supply a federal rule.2 0 8
Applying a Louisiana statute, the Fifth Circuit determined that DC could
pursue as an unsecured claim the gap between the value of the car upon
its return and the debt to DC.2 0 9 While the likelihood of the debt being
paid in full is no more likely than for other unsecured debts, it could not
be written off in toto.210
XIV. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to discern whether this year's opinions suggest the pres-
ence of any pattern or shift in Fifth Circuit and Texas bankruptcy cases.
It may well be that there is none. However, it may be that greater scru-
tiny will be applied to Chapter 11 filings, given the continuing increase in
such filings by heavily leveraged debtors, and given the continuous in-
creases in the costs of administering Chapter 11 estates and the apparent
201. See id. at 637.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 641.
205. Id. at 637-38.
206. Id. at 638.
207. Id. at 639.
208. Id. at 641.
209. Id. at 640-41.
210. See id. at 641 (citing In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2007)).
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decreases in returns to unsecured creditors, as well as heightened criti-
cism from courts and commentators. Certainly, opinions such as Gulf
Coast Oil Corp., which denied a section 363(b) sale,211 Energy Partners,
Ltd., which criticized and refused to approve investment banker reten-
tion,212 recent Fifth Circuit precedent apparently limiting the application
of the equitable mootness doctrine, 2 1 3 Fifth Circuit precedent limiting
non-consensual plan releases of non-debtors, 214 and bankruptcy court
precedent strictly applying various doctrines to preclude the assertion of
unpreserved causes of action postpetition,215 suggest that some greater
degree of scrutiny is being applied. Of course, this pattern may amount
to pure coincidence.
In any event, given the large number of filings, it can reasonably be
assumed that courts will have plenty of opportunities to further review
various issues and to refine answers to multiple questions. The authors of
this Article anticipate a year 2010 full of significant bankruptcy opinions.
In the meantime, practitioners will continue to struggle with difficult
cases, difficult facts, a difficult economy and lending market, and uncer-
tainties regarding multiple legal issues affecting both business and con-
sumer bankruptcies. The authors hope that this brief survey of 2009
developments will provide the practitioner with some assistance in ad-
dressing these difficult issues.
211. In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 410-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
212. In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 409 B.R. 211, 237-39 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
213. In re San Patricio County Cmty. Action Agency, 575 F.3d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 2009).
Due to the limits of this Article, only one recent Fifth Circuit opinion on equitable moot-
ness is included. For those interested in additional recent precedent, the authors suggest a
thorough review of the recent developments from the Fifth Circuit regarding this doctrine.
Whether by coincidence or plan, the Fifth Circuit has recently issued several opinions limit-
ing the application of the doctrine and striving to ensure that aggrieved parties are af-
forded their appellate remedies.
214. In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2009).
215. In re Manchester, Inc., No. 09-3027-BJR, 2009 WL 2243592, at *3, *6 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. July 16, 2009).
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